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Introduction
There has been much work described the trigger 
of the food crisis (particularly rice) that kicked in 
after the fuel crisis and further deteriorated by the 
financial crisis in 2008. The latter did not only wiped 
off the priority to address food security issue but also 
turned the prospective or/and ready investment off 
to save the subsequent economic crisis. Such case is 
a norm of human’s ‘short memory’ that tends to put 
the food security issue aside soon after food prices 
were soothed by the financial and economic crises. 
Although the crisis appeared to be driven by short-
term shock, current food prices are still at higher 
levels than pre-crisis levels. The renowned fact of the 
higher food prices has been tipped as the end of the 
cheap food era. 
As much as 90 per cent of rice is produced 
and consumed in Asia. This statement of fact has 
never been changed, however, the trends of shifting 
fundamentals, both on the supply and demand sides 
have been emerging. A Chatham House Report by 
Ambler-Edwards et al. (2009) warned that the global 
food system will come under renewed pressure from 
the combined effects of seven fundamental factors, 
namely population growth, nutrition transition, energy, 
land, water, labour and climate change. Some of the 
effects of change are already being felt. ‘Business-
as-usual’ is likely to fail and will bring unbearable 
political, social, and economic externalities, if action 
is not taken. 
Given the importance of food security, especially 
of rice availability and supply in Asian countries, this 
paper is interested in exploring the interrelatedness 
of some accompanying policy changes and initiatives 
in the selected Asian countries as well as reviewing 
the Malaysian National Food Security Policy. It is 
imperative for policy makers to understand initiatives 
taken by other Asian countries in relation to Malaysian 
reality and their implications for the Malaysian food 
security and paddy and rice sector.
Quick glance at the food crisis in 2008
The volatility in rice prices as illustrated in 
Figure 1 presents the sequence of important events 
in the food crisis of 2008. The cheap rice for the 
past 25 years came to an end when international rice 
prices started to rise in 2005 and escalated into a 
surge in 2007 and 2008. Much to do with control on 
domestic rice prices and step up supplies for domestic 
consumption, main exporting countries – India and 
Vietnam introduced export restrictions back-to-
back then China and Cambodia also halted exports 
of rice about the same period in the early of 2008. 
Subsequently, rice importing countries were hit by 
panic and resorted into ‘panic buying’. Philippines – 
the world’s largest importing country were struggling 
to find sources of supply and forced to purchase from 
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Thailand at a price of about US$700/ metric tonne 
(MT). Soon after that, many countries were alerted 
and fought to secure enough supplies for domestic 
consumption and storage. These competitions led 
Philippines to purchase the rice even at the peak of 
international rice prices (about US$1,000/MT). Then 
the looming global financial crisis and economic 
slowdown inadvertently pushed the international rice 
prices down by about 40%.
Policy measures, strategies and initiatives in 
selected Asian countries
The food crisis required immediate and 
precautionary actions. The decision to impose export 
restrictions was just one of the step-up measures 
to curb domestic rice prices and supplies. More 
deliberately, Demeke et al. (2009) provide a valuable 
compilation of counties’ response to the food security 
crisis. A number of Asian countries applied two, three 
or even four different policy measures, strategies 
and initiatives broadly in trade-based policy (both 
domestic and international trade policies), short-term 
production-based policy, and safety net programmes 
as shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
As defined by FAO (2006), there are main four 
aspects in the food security, namely availability, 
accessibility, utilization, and stability. Policy 
measures, strategies and initiatives in response to 
the food crisis were decided based on the aspects of 
food security which challenge merit most attention 
or investment. Subsequently, the policy measures 
mentioned above can be grouped accordingly to the 
four aspects of the food security:
Availability includes• 
release stock (public or imported at o 
subsidized price),
suspension/reduction Value Added o 
Tax and other taxes,
reduction of tariffs and customs o 
fees on imports,
restricted or banned export,o 
production support programmes,o 
productive safety nets, ando 
fertilizers and seeds programmes.o 
Accessibility includes• 
price control,o 
cash transfer, ando 
increase disposable income.o 
Utilization includes• 
food assistance.o 
Stability includes• 
price control or restricted private o 
trade,
restricted or banned export, ando 
reduction of tariffs and customs o 
fees on imports.
Beyond the doom, it is certainly not hopeless. 
Most of these policy measures are short-term and did 
produce plausible results in most countries. India, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and China have again committed 
Figure 1. Rice price (US$/MT), 2004-2008
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Agricultural Statistics, 2009.
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Domestic market-based measures Trade policy measures
Release stock
(public or imported at 
subsidized price)
Suspension/
reduction Value 
Added Tax and 
other taxes
Admin. price control 
or restricted private 
trade
Reduction of tariffs 
and customs fees on 
imports
Restricted or 
banned export
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Malaysia*
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Republic of Korea
Thailand
Vietnam
China
Indonesia
Mongolia
Bangladesh
Malaysia*
Pakistan
Republic of Korea
Sri Lanka
Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Pakistan
Philippines
Republic of Korea
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Vietnam
Non-market based production support measures Market-based 
interventionProduction Support 
Programmes
Productive Safety 
Nets
Fertilizers and Seeds 
Programmes
Bangladesh
China
Indonesia
Myanmar
Pakistan
Republic of Korea
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Philippines
Pakistan
Philippines
Bangladesh
China
India
Nepal
Pakistan
Safety net (increased or introduced)
Increase disposable income
Cash transfer Food assistance
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Cambodia
India
Indonesia
Republic of Korea
Bangladesh
Cambodia
Source: Demeke et al. (2009)
Source: Demeke et al. (2009)
Source: Demeke et al. (2009)
Table 1. Trade-based policy measures adopted by Asian countries in response to the food crisis
Table 2. Short-term measures aimed at supporting producers and production
Table 3. Countries that introduced safety net programmes in response to the high food 
prices
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themselves to international rice trade. We have also 
heard successful story of Indonesia in enjoying a rice 
surplus and started exporting rice since February 
2009 (Jakarta Post, 2009). Rice net importers like 
Malaysia have no privilege to enjoy this success, 
nevertheless, are motivated to correct rice policy for 
the shine of tomorrows.
The Malaysian National Food Security Policy
The policy objectives and instruments in 
Malaysia’s paddy and rice sector can be stretched 
back as far as the 1st Malayan Plan to the current 9th 
Malaysian Plan and the 1st National Agricultural Plan 
to 3rd National Agricultural Plan but food security has 
been the thrust of the policy for the sector. This pro-
longed policy is translated into a prominent objective 
to attain a reasonable self-sufficiency level (SSL) in 
rice which has been used as an index to food security 
in the country. SSL was targeted at a comfortable level 
of 65 per cent in the 3rd National Agricultural Plan 
(1998-2010) but was required to be at 86 per cent by 
the end of the Mid-Term Review of the 9th Malaysian 
Plan (2006-2010) in order to fit its production-centric 
vision of self-sufficiency level in most commodities 
for reducing deficit in trade balance. 
Most of the efforts are carried out via a 
comprehensive set of market interventions in the form 
of input and output subsidies, production programmes, 
Guaranteed Minimum Price for paddy, Paddy Price 
Support, and other production-based incentives. 
However, at its best, SSL in rice was just 72 per cent 
in 2007 compared to 74 per cent in 1985 though both 
paddy planted area and yield were at increasing trend. 
In greater details, there was just a marginal increase 
in paddy planted area from 654,974 hectares in 1985 
to 676,111 hectares in 2007 due to land competition 
from more profitable crops particularly oil palm. It 
was particularly serious in Sarawak where there was 
24 per cent shrink of paddy planted area while there 
was 23-fold increase in palm oil planted area within 
the same period. This was compensated by healthy 
growth in yield from 3.192 MT/ha, 2.081 MT/ha, 
1.335 MT/ha to 3.887 MT/ha, 3.243 MT/ha, and 1.702 
MT/ha in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak 
respectively. In return, there was higher production 
but it was offset by larger population that represented 
larger consumption. Statistically, population grew at 
a faster pace of 73% from 15.68 million populations 
in 1985 to 27.17 million populations in 2007 on top 
of decreasing per capita consumption of rice where it 
was 103kg in 1985 and 81kg in 2007.
Therefore, the unprecedented food crisis 
invariably shocked the country which needed 
imports of rice to fill the gap between domestic 
production and consumption. As recorded briefly by 
Demeke et al. (2009), Malaysia released rice stock 
(public or imported at subsidized price) and imposed 
price control at retail level. There were more efforts 
initiated by Malaysian government, of course, to 
handle the issue in short- and long-term policy 
measures. Amongst these was the National Food 
Security Policy which is directed at increasing rice 
production towards meeting the revised SSL target, 
especially in Sabah and Sarawak in short- and long-
term perspectives. In more details, Table 4 presents 
the paddy and rice programmes in the National Food 
Security Policy.
The programmes in the National Food Security 
Policy can be distributed into the aspects of food 
security accordingly. It is apparent that the policy is 
committed to continue its reign of production-centric 
objective for higher self-sufficiency level by investing 
heavily in Sabah and Sarawak after Peninsular 
Malaysia has knowingly achieved its limits in terms 
of land suitability and availability. However, many 
of these well intended programmes overlooked 
the challenges posed by the distinctively different 
institutional framework and natural endowment in 
Sabah and Sarawak. 
Due to different institutional framework in 
the administration of the states, funding for these 
programmes from the Federal Government is split 
into different departments instead of Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Industry in Sabah and Ministry 
of Modernization of Agriculture in Sarawak. Such 
complication indeed underscores the challenge 
in scheduling, logistics, and execution of the 
programmes. 
Natural endowment, on the other hand, requires 
serious consideration on feasibility and enormous 
long-term efforts on their organic and peat soils for 
paddy farming. The natural endowment is also the 
main constraint in infrastructure development which 
sees dropping number of farmers who received 
Incentive and Subsidy (a price subsidy of RM 248.10/
tonne is given to farmers who sell paddy to licensed 
mills) further to scattered location of farms (with 
limited number of licensed mills) and inefficiency 
in transferring message of policy changes to the 
farmers. 
Closer to the issue of food security, it was crucial to 
ensure availability of rice and accessibility, especially 
for the poor during the food crisis. The government 
introduced Miller Subsidy programme of RM800 
per MT production of 15% broken rice (packaged as 
Beras Nasional and retailed at RM1.60-RM1.80/kg) 
from domestic paddy in Peninsular Malaysia at mill 
level for a period of 6 months from September 2008. 
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Viewing that domestic rice production in Sabah and 
Sarawak was proportionately small in relation to total 
consumption, the government utilised 19,000MT 
of imported 5% broken rice from the stockpile and 
sold as Beras Nasional at retail price of RM1.80/
kg in Sabah and Sarawak. These measures, from 
a perspective of economist and policy maker, are 
temporarily interventions made by the government to 
provide safety net to the nation and to bring the sector 
back to normal.
Yet, international rice prices went down at a 
faster pace after the looming of the global financial 
crisis and economic slowdown. Hereafter, the Beras 
Nasional programme became an unneeded luxury and 
led to unhappiness among different parties. Though 
the programme was targeted for the poor but its 
distribution was reportedly missing in rural regions. 
Relatively, wholesalers were given different and 
inconsistent supply of Beras Nasional without any 
valid guidelines. Millers, on Peninsular Malaysia and 
East Malaysia basis, reflected different issues. Given 
lucrative subsidy for producing Beras Nasional, 
there existed unreasonable competition in getting 
supply of domestic paddy and subsequently saw 10% 
broken rice (SST10) disappeared in the retail market 
literally in Peninsular Malaysia. Millers in Sabah and 
Sarawak who were not included in the programme put 
up strong request for their eligibility. The request was 
granted. Then the Government renewed the subsidy 
programme for Peninsular Malaysia (RM750/MT) 
and extended the Miller Subsidy programme to 
Sabah (RM600/MT) and Sarawak (RM600/MT) with 
validity from 1 April 2009 to 30 September 2009. 
Viewing that domestic supply was not sufficient 
for local consumption in Sabah and Sarawak, 
imported Vietnam 15% broken rice was sold as Beras 
Nasional while local rice was retailed at RM2.10/
kg. Such difference inadvertently dampened the 
demand for local rice, culminating in the overhang 
of stocks at retail, wholesale, and mill levels (though 
millers were motivated to process local paddy via 
the Miller Subsidy programme). The well intended 
policy measures as a whole served its short-term 
purpose well but were inappropriately extended and 
implemented in longer-term and failed to bring the 
market back to normal by creating disequilibrium, 
disarray, and unhappiness among the market players.
The Green Revolution is a great result and 
No. Programme Description
Availability
1 Irrigation Infrastructure And 
Drainage Development
Develop new water source and increase irrigation infrastructure and 
drainage density to optimum level of 50m/ha
2 Irrigation Infrastructure And 
Drainage Maintenance Maintain paddy field area both in granary area or non-granary area
3 Pest Control Aid Control and reduce paddy disease due to the damage by pest. The aid is 
as much as RM200/ha/season 
4
Additional NPK Fertilizer Add nutrient supply through NPK fertilizer supply. The aid is as much as 3 bag @ 50kg per bag with the rate of RM400/ha 
5
Land Levelling Implement land levelling activity to improve efficiency of good agricultural practices. Rate of land levelling is as much as RM1,500/ha
6
Lime Application Supply lime to improve soil fertility. The aid is RM850/ ha
7
Farm Mechanization Increase number of machinery in rice cultivation 
8
Incentive and Subsidy Increase Paddy Price Subsidy and Productivity Incentive 
9
Miller Subsidy Encourage domestic millers to produce ST15 (Peninsular) and SS15 (Sabah & Sarawak)
10
Beras Nasional Subsidized 15% broken rice and retailed at RM1.80/kg throughout Malaysia
Accessibility
1 Beras Nasional Subsidized 15% broken rice and retailed at RM1.80/kg throughout Malaysia
Utilization
1 Research and Development Promote new method of paddy cultivation to increase productivity
Stability
1 Stockpiling Increase stockpile level of 92,000MT to 239,000MT
Table 4. Paddy and rice programmes in the National Food Security Policy
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successful application of research and development 
(R&D). However, there has been sheer neglect on 
rice production investment among the countries 
worldwide, Malaysia included. Annual budget 
for R&D in paddy and rice sector allocated by the 
government is always not more than 5 per cent of 
total budget for the sector. Some quarters suggested 
that research in paddy and rice only constituted 10 
per cent of the main agricultural research centre - 
Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute (MARDI) along with other small and limited 
research activities conducted by PadiBeras Nasional 
Berhad (BERNAS), universities, agencies and private 
organizations. These efforts, of course, fall in bits and 
pieces without a proper official, concentrated, and 
committed rice research centre (like International 
Rice Research Institute) in the country.
National Padi/Rice Stockpile scheme was 
introduced in 1949 during British colonisation. Rice 
is used as a buffer stock to facilitate the stabilisation 
of prices. It came into action during and subsequent 
to the food crises of 1972-74. Prior to the recent 
increase in stockpile, BERNAS took over the social 
obligation – national stockpile of 92,000MT rice 
from the National Paddy and Rice Board (Lembaga 
Padi dan Beras Negara) in 1994. Though population 
growth was certain, the stockpile level was maintained 
at the same level ever since then. The government 
then realized the need for extra stockpile in response 
to food scare (particularly during the food crisis) and 
committed to a higher level of 239,000MT of rice with 
a distribution of 78, 12, and 10 per cents for Peninsular 
Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak respectively. 
Moving forward
Arising from the discussion in previous 
section, it is obvious that there are a number of 
weaknesses in the National Food Security Policy, 
especially the extent of inappropriateness of short-
term interventions – the Miller Subsidy and Beras 
Nasional programmes as the international rice prices 
have gone down to lower level. These programmes 
stem the alarming inconsistency in the distribution of 
subsidized rice and inefficiency in its delivery to the 
poor. The financial crisis and economic slowdown 
also slugged and deepened food insecurity among 
the unfortunate group (FAO, 2008). More feasible 
programmes and actual help are needed to address 
the issue immediately and effectively. 
In longer-term, the National Food Security 
Policy target is to increase SSL in the country mainly 
attributed to an increase to 60 per cent and 70 per 
cent by 2010 from 30 per cent and 53 per cent SSL 
in Sabah and Sarawak respectively. These targets are 
postulated to come from expansion of paddy farming 
area of 23,017 hectares in Sabah and 25,583 hectares 
and Sarawak on top of 2,375 hectares which to be 
developed as granary area in Sabah. However, there 
are some anecdotal evidences from the perspectives 
of natural endowment and institutional frameworks 
suggest that these targets are over ambitious. Literally, 
similar suggestions were made by Lamb (2009) 
where 10, 20, and 70 per cents of future increase 
in rice production will come from area expansion, 
intensification, and R&D respectively. These 
suggestions underscore the ultimate importance 
of R&D while many parties tend to forget that the 
availability of rice and other foods that served us well 
for decades are masterpiece of R&D that succeeded 
the Green Revolution. The Malaysian government 
could setup a rice research centre with similar funding 
scheme (from tax on production) like Malaysian Palm 
Oil Board and Malaysian Cocoa Board.
 The ability to achieve SSL target as targeted 
in the Mid Term Review of the 9th Malaysian Plan 
is absolutely not likely. Coupled with the lesson in 
the food crisis in 2008, the renewed challenge is 
engaged in making consistent and viable policies 
and strategies for ensuring food security for the 
nation. Amongst many approaches, trade oriented 
self-reliance approach perhaps is more relevant than 
closed-door self-sufficiency approach in a highly 
integrated world market particularly that major rice 
exporting countries are in ASEAN. The self-reliance 
approach allows a country to import staple food 
from the world market when prices are cheaper than 
growing it in home country, so as to release land for 
more profitable or crucial alternative agricultural 
activities. The alternative agricultural activities 
certainly exclude perennial crops like oil palm 
and rubber plantation. Applying the self-reliance 
approach will need multiple and diversified sources 
of rice import in order to mitigate the effect of any 
supply disruptions under any impending crisis. Even 
if the impending crisis happens, Malaysia is believed 
to be able easily to source 600,000 to 800,000 tonnes 
of annual requirement from a global market of about 
28 to 30 million tonnes. 
Conclusion
Actions taken in response to the food crisis in the 
selected Asian countries have worked out well and 
produced promising outcomes from a combination 
of availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability 
aspects in food security. In greater discussion, Malaysia 
weighted more on availability aspect in food security 
by introducing more short- and long-term policy 
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measures for boosting paddy and rice production, 
particularly in Sabah and Sarawak. However, much 
of the unhappiness and disequilibrium in the local 
paddy and rice market were created due to irrational 
extensive intervention of the Miller Subsidy and 
Beras Nasional programmes in the nation. Many 
of the policy measures target at area expansion and 
productivity but it was suggested that the dominant 
path to achieve the targeted SSL is through R&D at 
specialized and committed paddy and rice research 
centre. Alternatively, the country may need to re-
evaluate its long-served self-sufficiency approach.  
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